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From a Roman Catholic point of view, a very stimulating 
development from within Seventh-day Adventist theology has 
been the work of Jean Zurcher in philosophical and theological 
anthropology. In a subsequent article I hope to  elaborate an 
approach to understanding the concept of immortality which 
will be faithful to both Adventist and Roman Catholic 
tradition, an approach which owes much to some of Zurcher's 
own ideas. Here, however, by way of a preliminary essay in 
this area, I would like t s  offer an interpretation and apprecia- 
tion of his thought. First, though, it should be noted thal just 
as Zurcher's position is not an official position of the Seventh- 
day Adventist Church, so neither am I an official spokesman 
of the Roman Catholic Church. Zurcher is an anthropologist 
in good standing as an Adventist. I am a theologian in equally 
good standing in the Roman Catholic Church. This essay is 
offered as an appreciation of Zurcher's work. 
Philosophical Anth~opology 
In his L'homme, sa nature et sa destinke : Essai SHY le problbme 
de l'lime et du corps, Zurcher traces the history of philosophical 
thought on the body-soul re1ationship.l Since this history 
bears on Zurcher's own anthropology, it will be well to point 
out some of its more pertinent aspects. He maintains, for 
instance, that the dualism which has often been man's most 
characteristic view of himself results partially, at least, from 
Neuchgtel-Paris, 1953. This has been translated into English as 
The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York, 1969). References will 
be to the latter edition. 
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his history of reducing himself to the status of object for the 
sake of self-analysis.2 To illustrate this phenomenon, Zurcher 
uses the myth of Narcissus: as a result of reflecting on himself, 
man has so fallen in love with his own image that he has in 
fact bestowed substantial existence to what he has come to 
know : 
From that moment, the subject seems to himself to be divided into 
two essentially distinct spheres in one of which the "me" perceived 
becomes subject while in the other the organism, instrument of 
perception, becomes by essence the object. And in the extension of 
this perspective the two oppositional worlds which constitute human 
reality appear more and more clearly the interior world of the "me" 
and the exterior world of the "not-me".3 
But it is to this initial perceptive process that the dichotomistic 
view of man is to be traced. This is what Zurcher refers to as 
the classical error: "to have conceived man as being a body 
or a spirit or an association of the two ; to have believed in the 
actual existence of parts, into which our thought has divided 
him, and to have regarded them as heterogeneous entities.'' * 
This anthropological dichotomizing seems to reflect the 
religiously dichotomistic view of nature, with its struggle 
between good and evil and the forces associated with them: 
light and darkness, spirit and matter, and so on. This religious 
world-view was later to have its effect on Plato himself. 
Zurcher traces the Platonic doctrine of the immortality of 
the psyche to the ancient Greek cult of Dionysus, in which 
the initiates worked themselves into a state of being with the 
god, or in the god ("en-thusiasm") : 
I t  is precisely in this aspiration to merge the self with the god, to 
lose the self in divinity, that the incipient belief in the immortality 
of the soul is found. From this source Greek philosophy derived the 
necessary ideas for the construction of a metaphysical doctrine of 
a divine soul whose life is eternal.5 
09. cit., pp. xv-xvi. 
Ibid., pp. 92, 93. 
4 Ibid., p. xviii. 
Ibid., p. 8. 
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On the other hand, in contrast to the Platonic view of man 
composed of two really existing substances, body and im- 
prisoned soul, there is the approach which Aristotle took to 
the same phenomena. Where Plato tends to be analytic (and 
consequently dichotomistic) , Aristotle is synthetic (and tends, 
therefore, toward a more unified view of man) .6 
I t  is intriguing for a Catholic theologian to note how 
appealing to an Adventist like Zurcher is the approach of 
Aristotle in this connection. Since Adventist theology 
describes man so frequently in terms of soma, psyche, and 
pneuma, it would be easy, though erroneous, to assume that 
its option is for a trichotomistic anthropology. On the 
contrary, however, Adventists describe their view of man as 
"monistic" or "wholistic," and consequently close to the 
Aristotelian approach to understanding the nature of man. 
Zurcher himself follows Aristotle in describing the soul as 
essentially creative of the body, which is its expression: the 
human form, Zurcher insists, realizes itself in matter in order 
that an actual being be constitued. But in order for this self- 
realization to take place, of course, one must posit the action 
of an efficient cause and a final cause (which, however, work 
through the soul, and in a sense are contained in it, though 
they transcend it). Thus, for Zurcher, the "form and matter 
are one and the same thing, the one potential and the other 
actual. Together, they constitute the unity of substance." 
Therefore, "there is no body and no soul, but only a co- 
existence of two, as in the case of the wax and of the ball 
which is formed from it." 
A difficulty arises, however, from the fact that there is the 
well-known Aristotelian distinction between the nous (the 
agent intellect, which as a universal participates in the Pure 
Intelligence, the Self-thinking Thought) and the psyche (the 
passive intellect), which is the individual form of the body. I t  is 
Ibid., pp. 23-32. 
Ibid., p. 25. 
Ibid., p. 26. 
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here that a dualism enters Aristotle's anthropology; he is never 
completely able to reestablish unity, though he tries by linking 
the active intellect to the sensitive soul as illuminator to the 
illumined, and this in a body with each other, the image 
transformed by the reality known.g 
The difference between the Aristotelian view and that of 
Plato is illustrated also in their respective views of death. 
Plato, when he comes to speak of death, sees it as something 
which has its effect only on the soma, from which the immortal 
Psyche is released. This notion had its influence on Aristotle, 
who, however, introduced the concept of the now as the 
immortal aspect of man, the psyche being simply the vital 
force of the soma, and consequently mortal. Neoplatonists 
(e.g., Plotinus) see corporeal existence as death for the psyche, 
with real life coming as the result of the liberation of the 
psyche.1° 
The early Christian philosophers were obviously influenced 
by this neoplatonic outlook (with death seen as either neutral 
or as a positive good). Zurcher sums up the subsequent 
development : 
The Christian conception of man certainly rested, in its origin, upon 
a totally different anthropology. . . . But the Christian phlosophy, 
founded by Clement of Alexandria and Origen, and presented by 
St. Augustine in a vast system which became the doctrine of the 
Church, rapidly established the pre-eminence of the fundamental 
elements of the Platonic anthropology. In the Middle Ages the first 
of the scholastic philosophies borrowed all its doctrine from Plotinus 
and through him from Plato, while Aristotelianism triumphed with 
Thomas Aquinas. 
Thus, throughout nearly twenty centuries, in spite of the diversity 
of succeeding systems, the various conceptions of man remain (with 
trifling differences) close to that of Plato or of Aristotle: that of a 
hybrid being, composed of an immortal soul and a perishable body.ll 
Modern dichotomistic views, however, have another source 
Ibid., p. 31. 
lo See Rudolf Bultmann, "Thanatos," Theological Dictionary of the 
New Testament, ed. Gerhard Kittel (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1965)~ 111, 
7-14. 
l1 Zurcher, o+. cit., p. 32. 
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besides Greek philosophy, and Zurcher has traced them to 
the very great influence of the Cartesian distinction between 
the thinking-self and the being-self .l Descartes, in opposing 
to the cogito a substantial existence comparable to that of 
thought, passes thereby from a methodological dualism inherent 
in the fact of consciousness to a substantial dualism.13 This 
results, anthropologically speaking, in a thinking-substance 
(the spirit) on the one hand, and a non-thinking, understood 
body-substance on the other ; the body is unnecessary to the 
spirit, which is self-sufficient and immortal. Descartes, how- 
ever, denied being a Platonist: "The soul is not only in the 
body as the pilot in the ship; it is closely joined to it and 
constitutes with it a single whole." l4 On the other hand, there 
are many passages in his writings which conflict with his 
expressed desire not to maintain a dualistic view of man.15 
There is much about the fact of the union (which Descartes 
arrived at  by intuition), but little about the explanation: 
The Cartesian doctrine of the union of soul and body retains above 
all a conspicuously contradictory and verbal character with regard 
to the dualistic conception of thought and extension. The radical 
incompatibility of the two contrary substances makes the third 
order of things, constituted by the union of soul and body, a 
chimerical being.16 
As we have mentioned, Zurcher's own philosophical anthro- 
pology is basically Aristotelian, though for obvious reasons 
he does not agree with Aristotle entirely, believing that the 
Christian concept of the spirituality of man leads to a more 
logical conclusion than that which flows from the immortality 
of the soul, and which Aristotle borrowed, consciously or un- 
consciously, from Plato. At the basis of Zurcher's own anthro- 
pological opinion is a postulate, unity : "With Kant we believe 
l2 Ibid., pp* 37-39, 43-57- 
l3 Ibid., p. 39. 
l4 Ibid., p. 51. 
l5 Some of these are cited by Zurcher, o;b. cit., pp. 51-53. 
l6 Ibid., p. 57. 
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that unity is actually a category of our mind, an indispensable 
condition which things must satisfy in order to be grasped 
by our intelligence and to penetrate into the field of con- 
sciousness.') l7 And so, anthropological unity is a necessary 
condition of consciousness and comprehension. 
With this postulate as the foundation, Zurcher develops his 
anthropology from three distinct approaches. First, he 
studies man metaphysically, that is, as human being-especial- 
ly in its relationship to absolute being; then, psychologically, 
in regard to human being's encounter with itself; finally, 
physically, from the point of view of human being's encounter 
with the other. These three points of view correspond with 
Semitic anthropology with its threefold outlook on man as 
spirit, soul, and body. 
Ontologically, man is a participation in being according to 
a particular mode-human being; and, as Zurcher points out, 
by this very fact the concrete reality of a particular being 
"is not simple, but composite. . . . the fact of actually being 
a composite being signifies that there are in every particular 
being two fundamental principles without which there would 
be no particular being." One of these principles is real being- 
itself; the other is the limited mode-of-being. These, of course, 
are not two substances existing in themselves ; rather, they 
correspond to the form and matter of the categories of 
Aristotle (whom he quotes with Aquinas at this point) .18 
There is a second dual aspect of man, and it follows from 
the fact that he is living being: man represents an essential 
synthesis of two correlative principles. There is no life where 
there is no being; and, conversely, when life ceases, being 
ceases to exist.lg This latter point is important, with a definite 
consequence for eschatology. 
l7 Ibid., p. 95. We might suspect that Biblical anthropology, which 
Zurcher would accept as revealed, is the basis of his postulate; but 
as a philosopher, he merely postulates unity. 
Is Ibid., pp. 107-109. 
l9 Ibid., pp. 110-116. 
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We can summarize the metaphysical data in Zurcher's own 
words : 
. . . he [man] is a material and spiritual being, a reasonable animal. 
Man is a corporeal reality endowed with psychic life whose superior 
activity has as formal object transcendental value. In  fact, all his 
activity bears the seal of his physical dependency in regard to the 
things which surround him. His knowledge is above all an experience, 
a contact with present realities. But man is not corporeal only, he 
is also spiritual; that is why this contact with the "me" in the 
physical world is conscious. Man has "consciousness" of the organic 
character of his activity, because the latter also reveals a spiritual 
element. This is what permits the affirmation that the two con- 
stitutive principles of the metaphysical structure of man are on one 
hand a material principle and on the other hand a spiritual principle. 
I t  is these two principles which are habitually designated by the 
terms of body and soul.20 
The body and soul, Zurcher insists, are integral principles, 
neither of which can be defined without the other. The soul 
is man; the body is man, the subsistent being. Neither can be 
conceived without the other. The dead "body" is not a "body" 
but a corpse; the dead "soul" does not exist. 
Zurcher also analyzes man from a psycho2ogical point of 
view-that is, in the act by which he himself constitutes his 
own essence, for Zurcher understands, as we have seen, that 
the "I" comes into existence with the consciousness: 
I t  is by means of consciousness that our participation in life is 
realized. . . . i t  is consciousness which gives us existence, for to 
exist without knowing that one exists is equivalent to not being 
or to being only an appearance in the consciousness of another. . . . 
In reality, consciousness is not only the little invisible and vacillating 
flame which lights our existence; it is our very being.21 
20 Ibid., p. 114. 
21 Ibid., p. 119; here Zurcher shows himself to be of the "psycho- 
metaphysical school" of Louis Lavelle, whom he frequently quotes 
and who in his last work wrote: "The soul is nothing more than con- 
sciousness itself insofar as i t  is an aspiration toward Value" (De ZJ&me 
lzumaiaze [Paris, 19511, p. 465). From this point of view, man, ex- 
periencing his freedom and capacity for creativity, proceeds from 
existence to being. Here Lavelle's outlook is close to that of both Jean 
Guitton and Gabriel Marcel. 
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This is not, of course, the same thing as saying that conscious- 
ness caztses existence, for, "Consciousness does nothing more 
than to apprehend the being, at the instant when it surges 
into existence, to communicate to it in some way the identity 
without which we should not recognize ourselves. " 
Thus, Zurcher rejects the view of "classical" philosophical 
thought which he sees as envisioning a spiritual substance, 
"realized even before being given to us," 23 the role of con- 
sciousness being simply, in this case, to enable us to know. 
For Zurcher, consciousness is "not only inseparable from the 
interior experience, which is the very condition for the 
existence of the soul, but moreover, the possibility for the 
existence to constitute its own essence.'' 24 
But once again, the soul is not an object in itself. This 
notion comes from the tendency to give the soul a role tran- 
scending that of consciousness, thereby giving the immortal- 
soul postulate a psychological justification. However, 
intimate experience, far from revealing to us a transcendental soul 
substance, shows us, on the contrary, a soul whose existence and 
essence depend every instant on the activity of consciousness. . . . 
This implies that the soul and consciousness are inseparable and 
that there is the closest affinity between them. I t  is absolutely 
impossible to conceive of one without the other . . . " 25 
Zurcher prefers to think of the soul, then, as being an existence 
rather than as having an existence, "since it is precisely the 
power that we have of making ourselves. . . . The essence 
of the soul is, thus, never a constituted 
which constitutes itself throughout 
existence. " 26 And so, in identifying the 
essence, but an essence 
the duration of an 
soul and consciousness, 
2 2  Ibid., p. 120. 
23 Ibid., p. 122. 
2 4  Ibid., p. 123. 
25 Ibid., p. 124; this, of course, raises the question "whether this 
personal consciousness is capable of persisting after the dissolution 
of the bodily organism9'-W. R. Matthews, "The Destiny of the Soul," 
The Hibbert Journal, XXVIII (January, 1930), 193. 
26 Zurcher, op.  cit., p. 125. 
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and consciousness with the self, he is saying that the soul is 
this self in process and that it (the soul/self) ceases to exist 
when consciousness ceases : "the soul is man in a way creating 
himself every day of his life. . . . The soul is . . . synonymous 
with man, or inversely, man is synonymous with the soul." 27 
The application for the question of self-knowledge, then, is 
that self-knowledge "is not to discover an object which is 
the self; it is, rather, to awaken in oneself a hidden life, 
the life of conscience." 28 
To sum up this psychological view of man as a soul, Zurcher 
has this to say : 
If . . . we wished to give a precise definition of the soul insofar as 
i t  is the spiritual essence of man, we should simply say that i t  
occurs . . . where the consciousness of self is allied to the capacity 
of self determination. 29 
Thus, freedom is an essential constitutent of human being, an 
aspect of human personality which results from conscious 
existence. These are aspects of man as a living soul. 
Finally, Zurcher considers man's exterior self-manifestation 
as he discusses the cor~oreal reality of man. His main point 
is to insist that body and soul are elements constitutive of 
man: corporeal and spiritual principles. Actually, as he 
indicates, the word "spirit" is better used to describe the 
soul as a spiritual principle, thus making it possible to distin- 
guish between the corporeal, psychic, and spiritual life of the 
individual. 30 
He does not, however, want to move from a Cartesian 
dichotomy to a trichotomy of more or less heterogeneous 
substances. The body, for Zurcher, constitutes the normal 
mode of expression of the individual: "it is not only the 
2 7  Ibid., p. 127. 
z8 Ibid., p. 128; furthermore, "the birth into a new life-which is 
the Christian revelation fiar excellence-is . . . the birth of the life of 
the conscience." 
29 Ibid., p. 129. 
30 Ibid., p. 137. 
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evidence of our existence, the expression of our affective life, 
but also the vehicle of all the movements of our thought.'' 31 
The spirit is related to both body and soul, for as he points 
out, since the incarnation, "the spirit is no farther from the 
body than the soul, and the soul is not more spiritual than the 
body." 32 Zurcher also emphasizes the fact that the body- 
manifestation 
can never be separated from the power which it expresses, since 
the means by which the soul realizes itself is also the means by which 
it  expresses itself. . . . In short, expression is so essential to the 
existence of the soul that the soul actually exists only to the extent 
that i t  gives to itself a body.33 
Theological Anthropology 
At this point there arises a question which remains un- 
solved in any purely philosophical approach to anthropology : 
that of the essential difference between man and the animal. 
Is it merely a question of degree of consciousness (and thus 
of personality and freedom) ? From the Biblical point of view, 
there is no essential difference on the level of the constitutive 
elements of man and animal-both are living creatures in 
the sense of Gn 2 : 7-and life is life. What difference there is 
arises from the creation of man in the image of God. Man is 
destined for personal relationship with God, and consequently 
there exists "in" man a point of contact between God and 
man which does not characterize the relationship between 
God and animals. This "image" is understood in contemporary 
Adventist theology in terms of certain capacities possessed 
by man but not by animals: the capacity to reason, the 
emotional capacities analyzed by psychology (even some sort 
of physical relationship-although this is a vague area). But 
the apex of these capacities, and the key to any genuinely 
theological anthropology , is man's capacity for spiritual fellow- 
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ship with God. This pneumatic level is the level a t  which the 
fellowship achieved in regeneration is reached. 
I t  is quite clear, therefore, that it is impossible to develop 
an adequate doctrine of the nature of man (especially in an 
eschatological perspective) without speaking of the destiny 
given man at  his creation. As Zurcher points out in the last 
part of his book, "the desire for immortality is found rooted 
in the depths of human nature." 34 This .~zatural desire (although 
he does not use this classical term of scholastic philosophy) 
he considers the strongest proof for the fact of man's being 
destined for immortality. We should not, however, think of 
this deeply-rooted desire as simply a static phenomenon 
extrinsic to man, which will be fulfilled eventually in the world 
to come. Rather, since in Zurcher's view the nature of man 
has been identified with his freedom, he can achieve this 
destiny in the process of exercising this freedom throughout 
the duration of his existence. 
In considering man's nature as very much bound up with 
his destiny, Zurcher insists that he is treating man "existen- 
tially"-i.e., in his situation before God-and at the same 
time is returning to the Biblical and Christian view of man. 
He thus expresses the harmony between Biblical anthropology 
and the existentialist anthropology of contemporary theology. 
He stresses the monistic character of the former: it presents 
man as a perfect and indissoluble unity of body, soul, and 
spirit; and he sees the accent on this unity underlying the 
essence of Christianity : 
When Christ speaks of the manifestations of our love to God and to 
our neighbor, the accent is not placed on the multiplicity of its 
possible manifestations-which vary, moreover, from one Gospel to 
another-but rather on the fact that each of them should be the most 
complete expression of the totality of the being. "Thou shalt love 
34 Ibid., p. 147; he goes back to this idea later: "It is not necessary 
to search very long for the conclusion that the destiny of man is found 
entirely inscribed in the metaphysical structure of his being" (ibid., 
P. 165). 
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the Lord thy God with all thine heart, with all thy soul, with all thy 
strength and with all thy mind; and thy neighbor as thyself."a6 
This monistic character is also in accord with the two key 
passages for Biblical anthropology : 
The Lord God formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed 
into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being 
(Gn 2:7). 
May the God of peace himself sanctify you wholly; and may your 
spirit and soul and body be kept sound and blameless a t  the coming 
of the Lord Jesus Christ (I Th 5 : 23). 
In both of these passages the unity of man's nature comes 
through. In the latter passage it might seem that Paul has a 
quite trichotomistic view of man; that this is not so is clear 
from the fact that Paul's other letters indicate that his anthro- 
pology is essentially Biblical. For instance, in I Cor 15 :45, he 
even refers to Gn 2:7: "Thus it is written, 'The first man 
Adam became a living being'; the last Adam became a life- 
giving spirit." Thus, the spirit, soul, and body are aspects of 
man's being-for-communion with God. And, "even if the 
manifestations of the being are manifold and very different, 
depending on whether they are made by the body, the soul 
or the spirit, they imply every time the whole man in a certain 
expression of himself." 36 
With this monistic stress as background, let us now turn 
to an analysis of Zurcher's theological view of the soma-psyche- 
pne~ma  relationship. 
In his comments on the concept of soma, he maintains that 
corporeality is an essential presupposition for the self-expres- 
sion of the human person in his relationship with God. 
Referring to Bultmann, he states that "there is no human 
existence, no human reality even in the sphere of pneuma, 
the mind, which is not corporeal, somatic," and any attempt 
as "The Christian View of Man: Part One," A USS, I1 (1964), 159. 
S 6  I b ~ d . ,  pp. 159, 160. 
6 
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to separate the two is ultimately destructive of man himself.37 
He points out that those cases in which individuals in the Bible 
speak of "my body" or "my soul" 38 are examples of man's 
psychological capacity to objectify his experiences, without 
which capacity human knowledge could not exist. This 
phenomenon is no proof of the substantial existence of a body 
and a soul in an adequate distinction from each other. 
In his discussion of the Biblical concept of psyche (with its 
Hebrew background of nephesh), Zurcher indicates the 
essential corporeality of this concept. It "designates the 
individualized life in a physiological sense [Gn 35 : 181, as well 
as in a psychological one [I Sa I : 101. " . . . the idea of psuchd 
embraces the total man, the entire human personality, the 
individual being in his perfect unity." 39 
In regard to the immortality of the soul, he repeats his 
contention that the soul is not one of the constituent elements 
of man, but rather man himself. Therefore, he reasons, the 
soul cannot be said to be immortal unless man can be said to 
be immortal. Man, however, is constituted by the union of 
matter and spirit, and the resulting "soul exists only insofar 
as man has consciousness of being." Perhaps if we identify 
"soul" with the "spirit" in man, we can speak of the separation 
of soul and body at death; but if so, we must remember, he 
says, that man as such dies (ceases to exist in the sense we 
have distinguished above) with their s e ~ a r a t i o n . ~ ~  
From this point of view, of course, death is a tremendous 
threat to man-it is not simply the death of the body, but of 
the man. Death, then, is not a mere change of dwelling, but a 
real death, that is to say, the cessation of life under all its 
forms, of conscious and psychic as well as corporeal life.41 
All must die because all have sinned. The gospel does offer man 
37 Ibid., pp. 160, 162; see also Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the 
New Testament (New York, 1951), I, 192. 
88 For example, Mt 26:38; Jn 12:27; I Cor Z:II; 9:27. 
S 9  Zurcher, "The Christian View of Man: Part One," pp. 163, 164. 
40 The Nature and Destiny of Man, p. 165. 
Ibid., p. 167. 
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deliverance from death, but not in the Platonic sense. Rather, 
Christianity "offers immortality only to the man who is freed 
from the law of sin by the Spirit of life which is Jesus Christ." 42 
There is even then, "no immortality whatever . . . inherent 
- in human nature but life eternal is for him who grasps it by 
faith and fashions his soul in the image of Jesus Christ." 43 
The destiny of man is bound up with the necessity for the 
body-soul entity we call man to become more "spiritual," 
that is, to become more configured to the image of Jesus 
Christ, the second Adam, the life-giving Spirit. This is what 
the Bible looks forward to for the soma, which is not a corpse, 
but the corporeal manifestation of the living man. The 
material body will be raised, but it will be pneumatikon, 
totally under the dominion of man's spirit responsive to the 
Holy Spirit. 
Zurcher's treatment of the concept of the pneuma of man 
identifies it with the "complete manifestation of man in 
spiritual or intellectual form." He states that "Paul. . . uses 
pneuma in the sense of nous, intellect," and maintains that, 
"when it signifies the human spirit, pneuma probably always 
has this sense. I t  then designates the manifestations of the 
intelligent being who 'knows,' who 'comprehends,' who 
'decides' [Php 4 : 7 ; I Cor 14 : 14-19 ; Rom 7 : 23 ; 14 : 51 ." But 
again, Zurcher insists, this is not the Greek philosophical 
sense of a disembodied spirit : "No more thanpsuchd orpneuma 
is nous ever opposed to s6ma; now is indeed unthinkable 
without sdma. For the human personality of which they are 
the manifestation has been created nous and sdma." 44 
Having discussed from a theological point of view the 
constitution of man as he is in himself, we turn to that of man 
in his relationship to God. Zurcher would, of course, maintain 
that a genuine Christian anthropology views man as having 
existence only in relationship to God his Creator. As he puts 
4 2  Ibid. 
Ibid., p. 169. 
4 4  "The Christian View of Man: Part One," pp. 164, 165. 
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it, "creation signifies . . . that while there exists a reality 
different from God, it does not exist in itself, but only through 
God." 45 Thus, there is no dichotomy here, either. Dependence 
is an aspect of creaturely existence, and a creature is a "being 
continually menaced by the possibility-excluded by God and 
by God alone--of nothingness and of win." 46 And this crea- 
tion, this creaturely existence, is fundamentally good: 
What is not good God did not make; i t  has no creaturely existence. 
But if being is to be ascribed to it a t  all, and we would rather not say 
that it is non-existent, then it is only the power of the being which 
arises out of the weight of the divine "No." 47 
Besides the creaturely, there is a second aspect of man's 
relationship to God: his existence as the image of God. Zurcher 
sees this as consisting, first, in man's function as representative 
of God on earth, as an expression of his real presence (Gn I : 26 ; 
Ps 8 : 6-7). But this involves also a responsibility towards God, 
which Zurcher situates in the context of obedience to the 
divine will-the area of decision. I t  is here that the freedom 
of man "permits him to think and to act, to accept or to refuse 
Being." 48 
There is a third aspect of man's existence in relationship 
to God: his existence as a s i ~ z n e ~ . ~ ~  I t  is in this connection that 
the Biblical notion of sarx must be discussed. The temptation 
to sin, Zurcher points out, is not the result of a body-soul 
dichotomy, but because of the conflict between "the law of 
the mind" and the "law of sin." Because of the moral history 
of humanity, man is not entirely free in making his decision. 
45 "The Christian View of Man: Part Two," A U S S ,  I11 (1965), 67. 
46 Ibid., p. 68. 
4' Karl Barth, Dogmatics i n  Outline (New York, 1959). p. 57, 
quoted by Zurcher, ibid., p. 70. 
48 Zurcher, AUSS,  I11 (1965), 70-73. Here, however, Zurcher seems 
to imply that the decision to accept or refuse "Being" is the same thing 
as to accept or refuse "being." At this point we get into the problem of 
the relationship between Being and being, which, though vital, we 
cannot treat here. See John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theolo- 
gy (New York, 1966), pp. 105-110. 
49 See Zurcher, "The Christian View of Man: Part Two," pp. 74-83. 
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A distinction must, of course, be made between sin and flesh; 
because of the existential situation of sarx, they are connected 
but not identical: "It is evident that the flesh is neither an 
evil substance nor . . . is it incarnate sin," says Zur~her.~O 
Yet the carnal state is de facto a state of powerlessness before 
the power of sin; and Adventist theology is not idealistic: 
[The] carnal reality of man is the first revelation of Christian anthro- 
pology. . . . A mysterious power makes man a slave of the "law 
of sin" incapable of submitting to "the law of God" even though 
he takes pleasure in it. . . . Such is the tragic situation of nature 
man, left to himself. He is a dead man who does not know true 
life, because he is a servant of forces contrary to life.61 
Having discussed Zurcher's theology of man's nature and 
relationship to God as creature, image, and sinner, we come 
to his thinking on the relationship of Jesus Christ precisely 
as life-giving Spirit, to the pne~ma of man in its state as sarx, 
or powerlessness. As Zurcher has indicated: by the work of 
Christ the Spirit of God has become an effective anthropolo- 
gical reality, "because it communicates to man the power of 
becoming a child of God, first in freeing him from sIavery to 
sin and then in causing him truly to participate in the nature 
of God." Ei2 
Zurcher connects at  least some aspect of dichotomistic 
thinking about man to dichotomistic thinking about the 
central mystery of Christianity, the redemptive incarnation. 
The fact, however, remains that the Word became sarx, not 
"in order to oppose human nature as such and to destroy it, 
but rather to free it from the power of sin, to sanctify it and 
to restore it to its original perfection." 53 The Son, by uniting 
himself to humanity, has made of his Spirit the fundamental 
Christian Spirit, and thus a vital factor of Christian anthro- 
pology. From this point of view, also, there can be no dicho- 
tomy in Christian anthropology: 
Ibid., p. 82. 
61 Zurcher, The Nature and Destiny of Man, pp. 159-161. 
6 8  "The Christian View of Man: Part Three," A USS, IV (1966), go. 
53 Ibid., p. 94. 
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The spirit speaks to the whole man and solicits his total participation. 
To the extent that He is in man, the Spirit acts. He creates and His 
action is manifested in the whole being: mind, soul, and body. 
This action begins by the renewing of the intelligence. After having 
been led captive to the obedience of Christ, then transformed by the 
knowledge of the Saviour, the intelligence becomes capable of 
discerning the will of God, . . . From that moment nothing further 
escapes the sanctifying action of the Spirit; the thoughts, the 
feelings and the desires, are all purified. The body itself becomes the 
temple of the Spirit.&* 
Linking this fact with that of man's constitution as image of 
God, Zurcher sees the relationship implied in the image as 
characterized now by a new dynamic, that of the call of the 
Spirit in man's life (Rom 8 : 16 ; g : I) : "As soon as man responds 
to the call of God, to the witness of the Spirit, the rupture 
between God and man is no more, . . . the power of sin no 
longer has an unshakable hold on him."55 Hence, the apparent 
dichotomy between the Holy Spirit and the flesh is overcome 
by the power of the Spirit in dialogue with the free spirit of 
man, which is strengthened by this contact to overcome the 
tensions with its own sarx-aspect: "Though the conflict 
between sarx and pnezlma is real, it is a conflict in which the 
spirit t r i ~ r n p h s . " ~ ~  Thus man enters into new life according 
to the Spirit, a life-in-process, looking forward to the attain- 
ment of the perfection of Christ himself. 
I t  seems, therefore, clear that Zurcher's phenomenological 
approach to the mystery which is man is in striking harmony 
with the Biblical intuition based on God's people's experience 
of itself in its concrete, historical relationship with God. What, 
moreover, makes it interesting to a non-Adventist is its 
openness to the interpretations of man emerging in many con- 
tinental theologies. This fact offers the possibility of greater 
mutual understanding between other Christians and Adven- 
tists on the issue of man's immortality. This issue is rooted 
6 4  Zurcher, The Nature and Destiny of Man, p. 163. 
6 6  "The Christian View of Man: Part Three," p. 98. 
66 Ibid., p. 102. 
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in the question : what is man ? Zurcher, as we have seen, views 
consciousness as the constitutive factor of hzman being; and 
here he is consistent with the Aristotelian concept of the nous 
as the distinctive element of man; since Zurcher denies the 
natural immortality of man, he would say that there can be 
(naturally) no noetic existence after death. This, however, 
reduces death to a "state" of non-existence-which, it would 
appear, fails to bear witness to the fact that the just man now 
participates in eternal life, the victory of Christ over death-a 
participation which would not take place until the second 
advent of Christ. 
How can we speak of the "existence" of man after death? 
Karl Barth has expressed our faith-reaction: 
If he, the Lord of death, our gracious God, the ineffable sum of all 
goodness, is present with us even in death, then obviously in the 
midst of death we are not only in death but already out of its 
clutches and victorious over it, not of ourselves but of God. We die, 
but He lives for us. Even in death we are not lost to Him, and there- 
fore we are not really lost. . . . Hence our future non-existence cannot 
be our complete negation. 57 
The response that the just exist in the mind of God might seem 
not very helpful, but it would appear to be a possible starting- 
point rather than a dead-end, for, as Josiah Royce has phrased 
If God is God, he views the future and the past as we do the present. 
. . . What has, for us men, passed away, is, for the divine omniscience, 
not lost. . . . if God views facts as they are, this indeed implies 
that death, . . . cannot . . . be . . . an absolutely real loss to reality 
of values which, but for death, would not become thus ~n rea l .~8  
Exploring the question via the route taken by Zurcher, that 
of theological anthropology, would at  least be to take a new 
approach to the problem. But this is a subject for another 
article. 
5 7  Chu~ch Dogmatics, ed. G. W .  Bromiley and T. F. Torrance 
(Edinburgh, 1936-), 11112, pp. 610, 611. 
58 "Immortality," in William James and Other Essays on the 
Philosophy of Life (New York, I ~ I I ) ,  p. 263. 
